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 THE MONOPOLY OF GLOBAL CAPITAL FLOWS:  




The U.S. economy is monopolizing global net savings, i.e., about two-thirds of the total.  
Other rich countries, such as Japan and Germany, oil exporters, such as Saudi Arabia, 
middleincome countries, such as China, and even some low-income countries, such as India and 
Indonesia, export capital to finance yearly U.S. current-account deficits. The resulting global 
imbalances are neither sustainable nor equitable.  
Capital should be recycled to poorer countries, instead of funneled, overwhelmingly, to 
the world’s largest rich country. Low-income countries need a substantially higher injection of 
real external resources and should be allowed to pursue more expansionary, growth-oriented 
economic policies. Blaming capital-exporting developing countries, such as China, for global 
imbalances is not the answer. Such countries are merely succeeding in developing rapidly. 
Other rich countries, which account for most capital exports, have to take the lead in 
dramatically restructuring their expenditures. They will be able thereafter to absorb a greater 
share of developing-country exports. The danger of a recession in the U.S. is rising, threatening 
growth in the rest of the world. U.S. policymakers have to move aggressively to contain private 
consumption, especially real estate spending, in favor of productive private investment, and 
boost exports relative to imports. Without such a structural adjustment, the danger of a ‘hard 
landing’ for the U.S. economy—and, by implication, for the rest of the world—will escalate. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Growth of the U.S. economy since the 1990s has relied on sucking in foreign savings at  
an alarming rate. The resulting rise in U.S. expenditures has been artificial, propped up by an 
increase in foreign liabilities, i.e., increasing foreign investment in U.S. assets, both financial and 
real. As a consequence, the U.S. external debt now stands at about 28 per cent of GDP  
and threatens to balloon further. 
This economic stance is clearly not sustainable. How the U.S. extricates itself from such a 
dilemma depends, in good measure, on what the rest of the world does. The impact of the U.S. 
economy on other countries cannot be ignored: the U.S. accounts for about 30 per cent of the 
world’s income and consumes about 20 per cent of everyone else’s exports. If the U.S. plunges 
into recession, the rest of the world is likely to be dragged down with it.  
Yet, current conditions are patently inequitable: the rest of the world piles up net savings 
(foregoes current consumption and investment) in order to allow the U.S.—an already very 
rich country—to live beyond its means. The level of expenditures in the U.S. exceeds its 
income by about seven per cent—a huge sum in absolute terms.  
The upshot is that global savings are flowing in the wrong direction—namely, from both 
high-income and middle-income countries to, overwhelmingly, the largest rich country in the 
world. The U.S. absorbs about two-thirds of global excess savings. As a result, poor countries, 
the ones most in need of capital inflows, are crowded out of global resource transfers. The 
current scale of transfers to the U.S. far exceeds the doubling of aid to poor countries that rich 
countries are now considering. Many developing countries are already foregoing their own 
development in order to ‘invest’ in the U.S. economic expansion. 
How did this situation arise? What are its implications for global economic trends? What 
does it imply for Official Development Assistance as a global mechanism for redistribution? 
What does it mean for changes in development strategies in developing countries? This paper 
tries to briefly address all of these inter-related issues.1 
2  THE 1990s U.S. ECONOMIC ‘RECOVERY’ 
As a stylized fact, governments in industrial countries tend to run fiscal deficits of 2-4 per  
cent of GDP while private sectors (households and firms) provide net savings of a similar 
percentage. The current account tends to fluctuate around balance.2 However, when the U.S. 
economy recovered from the 1991-1992 recession, its approach was unusual. Government cut 
down on its borrowing and by 1998 started running budget surpluses. Meanwhile, the private 
sector began spending at a faster rate and by 1997 became a net borrower. In an effort to 
reduce its large public debt (inherited from the Reagan era), the government ended up 
dampening demand for goods and services. Also, net exports remained negative, also 
dragging down demand. 
Had the private sector not spent more than it earned, there would have been no U.S. 
economic expansion in the 1990s. Net private sector savings plummeted from a positive six 
per cent of GDP (i.e., when its income exceeded expenditures) to a negative six per cent.3  
This represented a turn-around of about US$ 1.25 trillion in aggregate demand. What did  
this imply? Increasing credit to the private sector had to fuel this expansion. The sector’s net 
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borrowing rose from nearly zero to about 14 per cent of GDP by 2000, enabling private 
expenditures to exceed income by a similar percentage. About half of private-sector net 
borrowing was from abroad—namely, from other peoples’ savings.  
When the U.S. private sector flipped from its historical role as a net saver to a net 
borrower, its financial position became increasingly tenuous. Private debt as a ratio to income 
reached unprecedented proportions. While most analysts exulted in the longevity of the U.S. 
recovery, those who were more perceptive warned that such underlying financial dynamics 
were unsustainable.4 However, the prevailing view was that there was no great cause for 
concern because private wealth (net worth) was keeping up with debt. This was due mainly  
to the rising market values of stocks and real estate. 
When the stock market collapsed in 2000, one of the two main pillars of net worth 
collapsed along with it. Fortunately, real estate values did not similarly implode. Nevertheless, 
private sector spending slowed markedly, mainly because corporations began to reduce their 
private investment. A deep recession loomed unless the public sector pumped more spending 
into the economy.  
3  AVERTING A MILLENNIUM RECESSION 
At the first signs of a slowdown in early 2001, the U.S. government pulled out all the stops by 
running huge fiscal deficits. The Bush administration chose hefty tax cuts (mostly for the rich), 
combined with a big boost in military and security spending. Although these measures were 
an inefficient means to stimulate the economy, their sheer volume had the intended impact. 
The Government pumped roughly an additional US$ 700 billion into the economy (over two 
per cent of GDP per year) from 2000 to 2003. The speed in applying this fiscal stimulus was 
unprecedented. In addition, the Federal Reserve lowered its policy interest rate in order to 
stimulate the economy 
Although private corporations cut back on investment during this period, private 
households still borrowed in order to finance higher expenditures. Net borrowing by 
households has now risen to over six per cent of national income while government 
borrowing has reached almost four per cent (Cripps, Eatwell and Izurieta, 2005a). 
A significant proportion of credit to households was directed into real estate, driving up 
prices in major housing markets. Households were prompted to take on more debt because 
the loosening of monetary policy lowered borrowing interest rates. Perversely, lower rates 
were driving household debts even higher.  
This implied that the private-sector adjustment to the crisis of 2000 had been 
incomplete. Thus, if the real estate bubble collapses, this blow could trigger a downward 
spiral of the entire economy. Looser monetary policy (i.e., lowering interest rates) is unlikely, 
by itself, to avert such a crisis. Moreover, the private sector, already groaning under 
increasing debt, cannot be expected to boost growth. Almost one fifth of household income 
is already committed to debt servicing. 
The increase in both government and private-sector deficits has implied that the U.S. 
current account has also been running big yearly deficits. Over time, U.S. exports have covered 
an increasingly smaller share of imports. Since 2003, they have covered, on average, only 
4 International Poverty Centre Working Paper nº 12 
about two-thirds of U.S. imports every year. During 2005, this deficit increased to about  
US$ 750 billion, or 6 per cent of GDP—surely the largest current account deficit ever recorded.  
The U.S. has been continuing its voracious consumption of imports while its exports have 
languished. In other words, it has been spending significantly more than its income could 
justify. Unlike a poor developing country, the U.S. can enjoy such a privileged position since  
it continues attracting capital from abroad. Foreigners have been eager to invest in its assets, 
despite the precariousness of its financial conditions. As a result, capital inflows to the U.S. 
have reached about 11 per cent of U.S. income, and the stock of U.S. external debt has climbed 
to about 28 per cent of GDP.5 The U.S. has now accumulated over US$ 13 trillion in liabilities to 
the rest of the world. Simply servicing these liabilities would add to the current account deficit 
each year. And this servicing is likely to increase.6 
Capital inflows to the U.S. buoy private spending by adding to financial wealth and  
non-earned income. About 40 per cent of such inflows are invested in corporate stocks and 
bonds, 30 per cent in public securities and the rest in capital stock and bank deposits. Similar 
to capital inflows, domestic ‘holding gains’, such as the gains from the continuing appreciation 
of real estate, have a positive effect on consumption—also without generating real cash 
income. Because of such factors as appreciation, the net worth of the U.S. population has 
reached about US$ 50 trillion. Real estate accounts for half of this total value, followed in 
importance by corporate equities and pensions. 
These two effects, from capital inflows and domestic holding gains, continue to propel 
U.S. domestic consumption. The flip side of the current account deficit is that U.S. households 
have been able to consume seven per cent more goods and services than their incomes 
should warrant. Thus, U.S. standards of living have remained artificially high. This would  
not be possible unless investors in other countries financed the bill. 
The inflows of capital into the U.S. are almost twice as large as the amount needed simply 
to finance its current account deficit. This implies that the corresponding capital outflows from 
the U.S.—nearly all of which are private—are almost the size of the current account deficit 
itself. This suggests, in turn, that capital inflows (a significant proportion of which are public 
flows from central banks in other countries) are not only financing excess consumption by U.S. 
citizens but also reciprocal investment by U.S. private investors abroad. In other words, central 
banks in other countries are helping subsidize U.S. foreign investment and profits. 
The sustainability of this process has clear-cut financial limits. It depends, in fact, on an 
ever-increasing appreciation of U.S. assets. Domestic households have to be encouraged to 
continue purchasing over-priced assets (on the questionable assumption that they will 
continue to appreciate) and foreigners have to be motivated to continue acquiring U.S.  
assets, such as Treasury bonds, stocks, real estate and firms (on the additional problematic 
assumption that the U.S. dollar will not substantially depreciate). Thus, a sharp depreciation  
or sudden economic downturn could readily precipitate a major crisis. 
4  WHAT CAN U.S. POLICYMAKERS DO? 
U.S. policymakers have little room to maneuver to correct the economy’s grave imbalances. 
Fiscal policy is already over-stretched. The private sector is already ridden with historically  
high levels of debt. The last major remaining option is correcting the current account deficit—
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reigning in imports and boosting exports. A rise in net exports could contribute to increasing 
domestic aggregate demand.  
The real effective exchange rate of the United States did, indeed, decline by about 17 per 
cent between 2002 and 2004.7 But both exports and imports were slow to respond. Instead of 
improving, the U.S. balance on current account worsened, widening from -3.7 per cent of GDP 
in 2001 to -5.7 per cent in 2004. Devaluation increased the country’s import bill. During 2005, 
the rise in short-term interest rates in the U.S. appreciated the exchange rate (e.g., four per 
cent against a weighted average of the currencies of its trading partners). In addition, the rise 
in oil prices increased the cost of imports.8  
Much more drastic devaluation will be necessary to significantly narrow the U.S. trade 
deficit. By one estimate, U.S. exports would have to grow three per cent faster each year than 
imports over the next decade in order to eliminate the deficit.9 This scenario is highly unlikely 
since historic trends have moved in the opposite direction.  
Since some major trading partners, such as China, Hong Kong-China and Malaysia,  
peg their currencies to the dollar, they automatically depreciated their own currencies when 
the dollar fell in value.10 Since these countries, plus others such as Japan, have large stocks  
of foreign-exchange reserves, they also have the ability to protect the desired value of  
their currencies.  
As another means to substantially reduce imports, the U.S. government could induce a 
sharp recession (cutting back on incomes that are spent on imported goods) or erect higher 
trade barriers.11 Neither policy option is likely: neither is economically viable nor politically 
palatable. Under either option, people in the rest of the world would suffer since their exports 
to the U.S. would substantially decline. 
So, the U.S. economy continues to muddle along. While growth continues, structural 
imbalances become increasingly acute. Making normal macroeconomic assumptions based on 
a 3.0-3.5 per cent yearly rate of growth leads to the conclusion that both the fiscal and current 
account deficits are bound to rise to very high, unsustainable levels (Izurieta, 2005a). By 2008, 
the fiscal deficit could well rise to nine per cent of GDP and the current account deficit to seven 
percent of GDP.12 The country’s external indebtedness could become increasingly 
burdensome (i.e., rising to over 50 per cent of GDP).  
Unfortunately, there are no easy exits from this dilemma. But the general direction has to be  
a slowdown in the unsustainable rate of growth of aggregate demand in the U.S., in coordination 
with an acceleration in aggregate demand in the rest of the world. This acceleration has to start 
in other rich countries, such as Japan and members of the European Union. 
Some of the middle-income developing countries exporting capital to the U.S. could 
engage in expenditure-switching—i.e., rely more on domestic demand and less on external 
demand. However, this change in policy regime assumes that these countries will not be 
sacrificing, in the process, their success in rapidly accumulating capital and growing. This is  
a central question for China, for example. 
Many low-income developing countries are clearly in need of dramatic demand 
expansion. They need the freedom to implement more expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies. And to grow, they also have to increase their exports to both middle-income and rich 
countries. Their success will hinge, in large part, on acceleration of growth in Japan and the 
European Union, and continuing growth in large countries such as Brazil, China and India. 
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5  THE DYNAMICS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 
What are the consequences for the world economy of the severe imbalances in the U.S. 
economy? One of the salient features of the current global economy is that global savings 
has been rising—from 22.9 per cent of world GDP during 1991-1998 to 24.9 per cent in 2004 
(Table 1).13 Some recent commentators have speculated that global savings is now 
‘excessive’. The implication is that the world economy is suffering from “a paradox of thrift”.14 
But by strict accounting, it is not possible for savings to exceed investment at the global 
level. Only measurement errors could produce such a result.  
By contrast, severe imbalances between savings and investment among countries or 
groups of countries are certainly possible. Some countries can be large importers of ‘net 
savings’ while others can be large exporters. However, if the imbalances among such countries 
are severe, the resulting resource transfers are not likely to be sustainable. Abrupt corrections 
in the imbalances become more probable, particularly for large importers of savings. 
It is also probable that the global distribution of net savings (or ‘excess’ savings) is 
inequitable. Rich countries, which least need more savings, absorb most of the ‘excess’ savings 
in the world while poor countries, which most need more savings, receive little—or, worse  
still, export their net savings to other countries. For example, for developing and transition 
economies as a whole, savings now exceeds investment by 2.3 percentage points of GDP 
(Table 1). During 1991-1998, investment exceeded savings by an average of 2.1 percentage 
points per year. The current disparity is equivalent to net lending of capital to rich countries. 
This condition is not characteristic of all regions or all individual countries. For example,  
in Africa (which includes the oil-exporting countries of North Africa), domestic investment 
exceeds domestic savings—although only marginally. This imbalance is even more 
pronounced for sub-Saharan Africa. Countries in this region are grossly ‘deficient’ in savings. 
They have to rely on significant net lending of capital from other countries. 
TABLE 1 
Trends in Gross Domestic Savings and Investment 
(Per cent of GDP)15 







World 24.0 22.9 24.6 24.9 
     
Industrial Countries 21.6 21.1 20.7 19.4 
--United States 18.5 16.1 19.6 13.6 
--Euro Area 21.1 21.4 20.2 20.9 
-- Germany 22.7 21.8 17.7 21.3 
-- France 19.4 20.4 20.0 19.8 
--Japan 29.2 31.6 23.9 27.6 
--United Kingdom 16.8 15.6 17.0 14.8 
--Newly Industrialized Asia 31.8 33.8 24.9 31.3 
     
Developing and Transition 
Economiesa 27.5 25.4 29.2 31.5 
--Africa 20.1 16.6 21.0 20.6 
--Developing Asia  32.8 31.3 35.5 38.2 
--Middle East 25.6 22.9 25.4 32.0 
--Latin America 21.2 18.3 19.8 21.0 
--CISb 16.2c 24.2c 21.4 29.4 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 2005, Table 43, pp. 271-273. Notes: ‘a’: Includes Central and Eastern Europe 
and Russia, ‘b’: Includes Russia. ‘c’: Denotes 1999 (data not available earlier). 
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For most of the IMF regional groupings of developing and transition economies, domestic 
savings exceeds domestic investment (net savings is positive). The disparity is largest among 
countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States—a result driven mainly by the net 
savings of Russia (an oil exporter). There is also a marked disparity between savings and 
investment among countries in the Middle East, chiefly because of the rising prices of their oil 
exports. For example, the differential in Saudi Arabia between savings and investment is an 
astounding 20 percentage points of GDP. The disparity is also large for Developing Asia, with 
China’s surplus savings looming large in the regional aggregate. Surpluses in other Asian 
countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, are also prominent.  
When developing countries are grouped by income levels, savings exceeds investment 
in lower middle-income and upper middle-income countries, but not in low-income 
countries.16 Net savings has grown in both upper and lower middle-income countries since 
1990. For upper middle-income countries, for example, savings now exceeds investment  
by five percentage points of GDP. In lower middle-income countries, this disparity is two 
percentage points. By contrast, in low-income countries, where savings is most needed, it 
falls short of investment by three percentage points. These are the countries most in need  
of an injection of capital. 
In other words, the real issue is whether global net savings are being recycled to poorer 
developing countries, such as in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, or to richer countries, such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom. Both South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have 
tended to suffer from ‘deficient’ savings: their domestic savings rates are not high enough to 
finance even their current domestic investment rates (much less the higher rates they need). 
The average savings rate in sub-Saharan Africa is particularly low, namely, 18 per cent of GDP.  
In industrial countries as a whole, domestic savings are also ‘deficient’. Both savings and 
investment have been declining in rich countries but savings has been dropping faster. In 
2004, investment exceeded savings by 1.3 percentage points of GDP (Table 1). But this result  
is attributable principally to the low savings rates of countries such as the United States (where 
savings is only 13.6 per cent of GDP) and the United Kingdom (where it is only 14.8 per cent of 
GDP). In the United States, investment exceeded savings by a whopping 5.5 per cent of GDP in 
2004. As a result, it urgently needs to suck in savings from other countries 
Other rich countries, such as Japan and Germany, are contributing a large share of global 
surplus savings, on which the United States and the United Kingdom are drawing to finance 
their domestic investment. In Japan, for example, domestic savings is 27.6 per cent of GDP, 
exceeding investment by 3.7 percentage points. The newly industrialized economies of  
Asia (Hong Kong-China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province) collectively 
contribute net savings amounting to 6.4 percentage points of their aggregate GDP (Table 1). 
Their aggregate domestic savings rate is about 31 per cent of GDP and their domestic 
investment just under 25 per cent.  In Developing Asia, which is much poorer, the aggregate 
savings rate is about 38 per cent, with China’s rate being very high, at 47 per cent.17 
Countries with high savings rates often try to keep the value of their currencies low  
in order to promote export-led growth. This can result in large current account surpluses.  
These are the external counterparts of the disparities between their high domestic savings 
rates and their lower domestic investment rates. For example, less investment translates into 
lower domestic income and lower income translates, in turn, into lower consumption of 
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imported goods (as well as exportables). An export-led growth model often relies on holding 
down domestic income—particularly the real wages of workers in export sectors. 
In effect, these countries export capital to countries with current account deficits.18  
The world’s biggest importer of capital—because it is running the biggest current account 
deficit—is the United States (Table 2).  It is soaking up about two-thirds of the current-account 
surpluses (i.e., net savings) of all current-account surplus countries. The principal exporters of 
savings are industrialized countries, such as Japan and Germany; newly industrialized 
countries, such as the Republic of Korea and Singapore; oil exporters, such  
as Russia and Saudi Arabia; and rapidly growing middle-income countries, such as China  
(see Tables 2 and 3).  
TABLE 2.  
Current Account Balances of Industrial Countries 
(Billions of U.S. Dollars, 2004) 
Country Current Account Balance 
Deficit Industrial Countries  
United States -666 
Spain -49 
United Kingdom -47 
Australia -39 
Italy -25 






Newly Industrial Economies  
Singapore +28 
Rep. of Korea +27 
Taiwan Province +19 
Hong Kong SAR +16 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 2005, Table 26, p. 238. 
 
For Neo-Classical Economics, the general direction of capital in the global economy makes 
little sense. Rich countries, where capital is relatively cheap (has a low rate of return), should be 
exporting capital to poorer countries, where it is relatively expensive (has a high rate of return). 
But this is not evident when global aggregates are calculated. Rich countries export capital 
mainly to other rich countries. Even many middle-income developing countries are transferring 
their net savings to a few rich countries instead of investing them in poorer countries. Not only  
is this stark imbalance inherently unstable but also it is conspicuously inequitable. 
Between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit rose by US$ 549 billion, to reach 
US$ 666 billion (see Wolf, 2005a). This amount represented over eight times the total Official 
Development Assistance provided by all donor countries in 2004. This highlights the regressive 
structure of the global transfer of resources. 
Other rich countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia and Spain, also have sizeable 
deficits (Table 2). But the U.S. current account deficit alone (US$ -666 billion) accounted for over 
200 per cent of the aggregate deficit (i.e., US$ -328 billion) of rich countries in 2004. Basically, the 
rest of the world—including current-account surplus countries such as Japan, Germany and 
Switzerland—have compensated by maintaining large surpluses. This category also includes 
newly industrialized countries in Asia, such as Singapore and the Republic of Korea. 
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Up until 1998, developing and transition countries were running sizeable current account 
deficits; thereafter, however, they swung rapidly into surplus. For example, while the 
aggregate current account of developing and transition countries had a deficit of US$ -115 
billion in 1998, it had reached a surplus of US$ 247 billion in 2004 (Table 3). This surplus 
covered about 37 per cent of the current account deficit of the United States.  
TABLE 3 
Current Account Balances of Developing and Transition Economies 1997-2004 
(Billions of U.S. Dollars) 
Grouping or Country 1997 1998 2003  2004 
All Developing and Transition Countries -85.6 -115.1 +149.1 +246.6 
Africaa -6.2 -19.4 -1.7 1.1 
--Sub-Saharan Africa -9.0 -17.7 -11.4 -9.7 
Central/Eastern Europe -21.1 -19.3 -37.0 -50.6 
CIS Countries -8.8 -9.6 36.2 64.4 
--Russia -2.6 -2.1 +35.4 +59.6 
Developing Asia +7.7 +49.3 +85.8 +103.3 
--China +34.4 +31.6 +45.9 +70.0 
--India -3.0 -6.9 +6.9 +2.1 
--Other Asian Countries -23.8 +24.6 +33.1 +31.3 
Middle East +9.5 -25.5 +59.3 +112.5 
Latin America -66.7 -90.5 +6.6 +15.9 
--Brazil -30.3 -33.3 +4.2 +11.7 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 2005, Table 28, p. 241. Note: ‘a’ includes N. Africa. 
 
In Asia, two-thirds of the swing from deficits to huge surpluses occurred during 1996-1998, 
as a result of the financial crisis that swept the region. Developing Asia’s current account 
surplus had reached US$ 103 billion in 2004, with China alone accounting for US$ 70 billion. 
Countries in the Middle East have also begun to rapidly generate current account surpluses 
because of the rise in oil prices. In 2004, their aggregate surplus was about US$ 113 billion. 
Saudi Arabia has had the largest surplus among this group. Another major current-account 
surplus region is the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia, which is about US$ 60 
billion in surplus, dominates the regional aggregate.19 
The only developing region listed in Table 3 that is running an aggregate current account 
deficit is sub-Saharan Africa. Its deficit position, e.g., about US$ -10 billion in 2004, is little 
changed from 1997. Instead of running a deficit, South Asia achieved a small current account 
surplus by 2004, with India leading the grouping with a surplus of about US$ 2 billion. So some 
poor regions have recently joined the capital-exporting band wagon. 
One of the most noteworthy features of this global imbalance is that governments in 
countries with current account surpluses—including those in developing countries—have 
been financing over forty per cent of the U.S. current account deficit. Thus, it is not just the 
private sector that has been speculating on U.S. assets. The tragedy for developing countries, 
in particular, is that in order to do so, their governments have been following restrictive fiscal 
and monetary policies while building up large foreign-exchange reserves.  
In other words, these countries have been sacrificing productive investment in their own 
countries. Since the current account balance must equal savings minus investment, by 
macroeconomic definition, investment has fallen relative to savings in developing countries 
while their current account surpluses have increased (see World Bank 2005a, pp. 56-57).  
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Developing-country investments in U.S. assets do provide a rate of return. However, for 
countries badly in need of development finance, especially in much of sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia, the opportunity costs of choosing U.S. assets—namely, the loss of investment 
resources—are indeed large. These countries need financing for fiscal expansion, with a focus 
on public and private investment. Correspondingly, the U.S. economy has to undergo some 
form of fiscal slowdown—in order to bring its expenditures into line with its income. This 
would imply a rise in its low rate of domestic savings, with the increase becoming available  
to finance domestic investment. 
6  THE RISE IN FOREIGN-EXCHANGE RESERVES 
One way that developing countries finance the gargantuan U.S. current account deficit is to 
hold US dollar-denominated international reserves. These are estimated to constitute about  
70 per cent of all international reserves. Almost all reserves are held in five major currencies 
(the U.S. dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, British pound and Swiss franc) (World Bank, 2005a).  
The rate of return for such secure financial assets is low, usually about 2-3 per cent per year.  
China has been a large holder of foreign-exchange reserves (i.e., about US$ 416 billion in 
2003 (Table 4). But its reserves have been increasing rapidly.20 Hong Kong-China held another 
US$ 118 billion in 2003. India also held about US$ 104 billion. As of 2003, Japan held, by far,  
the largest stock of such assets, namely, US$ 674 billion. Newly industrialized countries in Asia 
also hold large reserves: the Republic of Korea had about US$ 156 billion and Singapore about  
US$ 96 billion in 2003. While reserves held by Asian economies have been dramatically on the 
rise since 1990, the reserves held by industrial countries, such as Germany and France (as well 
as the United States), have been stagnant. 
In aggregate, developing and transition economies have been increasing their 
international reserves since the late 1990s. One useful measure is to compare reserves to 
imports (since reserves are often accumulated as a precaution against a sudden increase in 
imports). From 1997 to 2004, the ratio of reserves to imports for developing and transition 
economies increased by almost 50 per cent (Table 5).  
TABLE 4 
Total Reserve Holdings, 1990 and 2003 
(US$ Billions) 
Country 1990 Reserves 2003 Reserves 
Japan 87.8 673.6 
China 34.5 416.2 
United States 173.1 184.0 
Rep. of Korea 14.9 155.5 
Hong Kong, China 24.7 118.4 
India 5.6 103.7 
Germany 104.5 96.8 
Singapore 27.7 95.7 
Russian Federation --- 78.4 
France 68.3 70.8 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005, Table 4.15, pp. 254-256. 
 
Terry McKinley 11 
 
By the end of 2004, developing countries alone held an estimated US$ 1.6 trillion in 
reserves. Most of these reserves were held by middle-income developing countries. But some 
low-income countries, such as India, recorded large increases (Table 4).  
In the Middle East, the ratio of reserves to imports increased by about 23 per cent. 
However, in Russia, a big oil exporter, this ratio skyrocketed. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, this 
ratio increased by 30 per cent, although from a relatively low base.  
Many of the developing countries holding large foreign-exchange reserves, particularly 
those in Asia, have systematically tried to sterilize their impact on their domestic money 
supply. This has aborted the expansion of domestic credit, which could have stimulated 
private investment and closed the gap of investment with domestic savings. In 2004, for 
example, the gap between the increase in foreign currency holdings and the domestic 
monetary base was 11 percentage points of GDP in China and eight percentage points of  
GDP in India (Wolf, 2005b). Countries have insisted on holding large reserves as a buffer  
against financial instability. Instead of selling reserves, they have resorted to sterilization  
of their monetary impact because of their inordinate fear of inflation. 
If the central banks of these countries had sold the foreign exchange that they had 
accumulated from trade surpluses in exchange for domestic currency circulating within  
their economies, they could have financed larger imports, particularly capital goods. Thus,  
in two basic respects, holding excessive foreign-exchange reserves has an opportunity cost:  
1) such holdings prevent the transfer of real resources into the economy through increased 
imports and 2) such holdings could have been used to supply more credit for domestic 
private investment.  
Holding reserves can also have explicit costs. When central banks sell government 
securities in order to sterilize the monetary impact of their reserves, they usually have to pay 
higher interest rates on these securities than they receive on the foreign assets in which they 
hold their reserves (e.g., U.S. dollar-denominated Treasury bonds). Central banks also face 
exchange-rate risks in this situation. If they hold a large share of their reserves in U.S. dollar-
denominated assets—as most countries do—then depreciation of the dollar would lead to  
a significant capital loss in domestic currency terms.21  
TABLE 5 
Trends in International Reserves of Developing and Transition Economies 1997-2004 
(Ratio of Reserves to Imports) 
Grouping or Country 1997 2000 2004 
Sub-Sahara Africa 28.0 33.6 36.4 
Russia 14.9 40.6 94.7 
Other CIS Countries 16.2 17.6 29.2 
Developing Asia 44.6 50.0 80.5 
China 87.2 67.4 101.6 
India 43.4 52.6 98.8 
Middle East 71.4 76.4 87.8 
Latin America 50.9 41.7 51.4 
Brazil 66.0 43.5 66.0 
Mexico 33.8 27.6 42.8 
All Developing & Transition Economies 43.7 46.8 65.2 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 2005, Table 35, p.260. 
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The cumulative effect of amassing such large stockpiles of reserves is a slowdown in 
global growth relative to potential. This is particularly pronounced in developing countries if 
they hold foreign assets, such as U.S. treasury bonds and corporate equity, instead of investing 
in domestic capital (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005). This is a system in which global recession is 
temporarily averted essentially by expanding the consumption of relatively rich populations in 
industrial countries, in this case, principally in the United States. And this excessive level of 
consumption is financed by increasing levels of U.S. external debt, both public and private.  
7  THE POLICY OPTIONS FOR CORRECTING GLOBAL IMBALANCES  
What kind of structural adjustment can correct the severe global imbalances in income flows 
and asset accumulation? What can rich countries—both those with huge current account 
deficits and surpluses—do? What do middle-income countries need to do, particularly those 
with large current account surpluses? And what strategies should low-income countries 
employ, notably those that neither generate nor attract much development finance? 
Rich countries tend to blame rapidly growing middle-income countries, such as China, for 
the global imbalances. Many middle-income countries in Asia have been running large current 
account surpluses. However, at the global level the largest surpluses in Asia (such as for 
mainland China, Hong Kong-China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) taken together do not 
cover more than 17 per cent of the U.S. deficit. In contrast, other rich countries balance out 
over half of the U.S. deficit (World Bank, 2005a). Among rich countries, Japan’s surplus alone 
covers over one quarter of the U.S. deficit.  
In comparison, all developing country surpluses cover, at the global level, a little over  
one-fifth of the U.S. deficit. Lower middle-income countries alone account for 18 per cent. 
Among this group, China accounts for about 10 per cent of the U.S. deficit. So adjustment in 
developing countries is not likely to contribute decisively to correcting the massive imbalances 
distorting the global economy. 
One of the central implications of this analysis is that greater emphasis should be placed 
on rich countries.22 Japan and countries in the Euro zone (mainly Germany) need to deploy 
more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. This expansionary adjustment will raise 
domestic investment relative to domestic savings and stimulate aggregate demand, including 
the demand for imports. This is crucial for the expansion of exports from developing countries 
since the U.S., by running huge current account deficits, has been absorbing a 
disproportionate share of such exports. The currencies of other capital-exporting rich countries 
should be allowed to appreciate and their import regimes should become more liberalized.  
In order to stimulate domestic investment, they will also need to lower policy interest rates. 
7.1  THE U.S. POLICY RESPONSE 
What should U.S. policymakers do? The general direction of policy is evident. Policymakers 
need to slow domestic spending. And, in compensation, they need to narrow the huge trade 
deficit. Recent devastation from hurricanes and the jump in oil prices compound problems 
that were already severe and worsening. The likelihood of a sharp recession has intensified. 
Hence, policies should be geared, as soon as possible, to mitigating such a danger.  
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Policymakers should follow a gradual approach: reducing military and security 
expenditures, along with corporate-welfare expenditures (such as cotton subsidies), while  
raising tax revenue (beginning with re-instating income tax rates that were cut and then 
making the tax structure more progressive). The savings from expenditure reductions could 
thus be redirected to public investment in social and economic infrastructure.  
Policy interest rates may need to increase further in order to dampen consumption 
expenditures and raise domestic savings. However, this would likely exert upward pressure on 
the exchange rate (given the experience of 2005). In response, policymakers could encourage 
a more substantial depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. A depreciation of 30 per cent or 
more is probably required to reduce a persistently high trade deficit, particularly because rising 
oil prices are now fattening the U.S. import bill.   
In general, expenditure switching policies should be implemented in order to overhaul 
the composition of aggregate demand: raising productive investment relative to consumption 
and real estate spending, boosting exports relative to imports and restraining government 
deficits (which are negative savings) while augmenting domestic private savings as a basis to 
finance investment. However, the main underlying problem is excessive household spending, 
not deficit spending by the government. 
Large and continuous capital inflows into the United States have neither boosted 
domestic savings nor stimulated productive investment. On the contrary, they have fueled a 
consumption boom and depressed domestic savings. Such a detrimental impact, known as the 
‘Griffin effect’, is not uncommon.23  
If U.S. policymakers can carry out a comprehensive package of expenditure-switching 
policies, they can hope to avert a large and painful recession, which would necessitate, not 
merely switching expenditures but substantially reducing them. The success of these policy 
reforms will depend, however, on the concomitant success of capital-exporting rich countries, 
such as Japan and Germany, in stimulating domestic demand, i.e., moving in the opposite 
direction. This implies that such countries would run larger fiscal deficits and loosen monetary 
policy in order to expand domestic investment and consumption. A rise in imports and a 
corresponding decline in current account surpluses would be likely to follow. 
The large oil exporting countries are generating levels of domestic savings that far exceed, 
in many cases, their levels of domestic investment. In the middle-income oil exporters in which 
poverty remains substantial, such as Algeria, Russia and Venezuela, concerted measures are 
needed to expand public investment and stimulate private investment. However, since oil  
prices are likely to remain high for the foreseeable future, the domestic savings of all oil 
exporters, particularly in the Middle East, will continue to outpace domestic investment. New 
global redistributive mechanisms should be constructed to recycle these surplus savings to  
low-income countries, which are the least able, on their own, to finance an acceleration of growth.  
7.2  CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
What should capital-exporting middle-income countries, such as China, do to adjust their 
development strategies? After all, such countries account for a predominant share of the 
capital exports from developing countries. Some analysts have argued that China should 
abandon its export-led model of development and shift to a strategy driven principally by 
domestic demand (Palley, 2004).  
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Such an analysis maintains that China should begin—in conjunction with Japan and other 
Asian exporters—to revalue its currency. The Chinese government has indeed recently 
abandoned an exchange rate rigidly pegged to the U.S. dollar but it continues to maintain its 
currency within a very tight band. The principal reason: an undervalued exchange rate is 
essential to the success of its export-led, FDI-supported development strategy. In order to 
maintain the competitiveness of its exchange rate, China must dampen inflationary pressures 
(including the inflationary pressure exerted by an undervalued exchange rate itself). China 
tries to achieve this objective by systematically sterilizing the monetary impact of its large and 
growing foreign-exchange reserves.24 
There are clearly disadvantages to such a strategy. First, it relies on containing increases in 
real wages in export industries, and in industry in general.25 This is the corollary of its 
undervalued exchange rate. China relies on relatively low wages (combined with relatively 
higher productivity) in order to produce competitive exports. Extensive foreign direct 
investment helps deliver productivity that is high relative to the Chinese wage level.  
Thus, China’s development policies are based on constraining domestic demand—
consumption demand in particular. Also, low import demand follows suit. Low real wages 
require, in turn, inexpensive wage goods. This implies a priority on keeping food prices low. 
Such policies also help explain why the distribution of income has become markedly more 
unequal during China’s transition to a more market-based economy. Containing increases in 
income among workers and farmers helps dampen domestic demand for goods and services. 
While rapid economic growth has substantially reduced extreme poverty, the rise in inequality 
has partially neutralized growth’s potential impact on poverty. New forms of poverty are on 
the rise, such as in urban areas. 
In order to address these problems, public investment needs to be redirected. Helping 
raise agricultural productivity would be a priority. Re-channeling credit to boost the growth of 
employment-intensive domestic private firms would also help. 
China’s development strategy also has, no doubt, some noteworthy advantages. It has 
been a remarkably successful strategy for rapid capital accumulation. On this score, China’s 
development during the last two decades has been unprecedented. Not only has China been 
able to mobilize substantial domestic savings (e.g., 47 per cent of GDP in 2003) but also it has 
attracted an unparalleled inflow of foreign direct investment. In 2003, for instance, 35 per cent 
of all net inward FDI into developing countries flowed into China alone.  
Without such a ready source of external financing for its industrialization, China would 
have been forced to extract a resource surplus from agriculture. Such a strategy would have 
had an immiserizing impact on the rural population and likely precipitated a much higher 
increase in inequality.    
FDI has been attracted to China not only because of its export orientation but also 
because of its potentially huge domestic market. China’s domestic savings is used to reinforce 
and subsidize foreign direct investment. Such subsidies take various forms, including keeping 
real wages low in industry and ensuring the requisite public investment in social and economic 
infrastructure. Channeled into state-controlled domestic banks, China’s huge pool of savings 
helps provide relatively inexpensive credit for state-owned industrial enterprises and for 
widespread public investment.  
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Capital controls are also essential to ensure that domestic savings does not leak out of the 
economy. Since domestic interest rates are kept low, they have little influence on allocating 
capital. High interest rates are not needed, in fact, to attract and hold capital inflows. A sizeable 
proportion of domestic savings is absorbed by public securities offered at low interest rates. 
Through such means, the state ensures that domestic savings is mobilized, and deployed 
effectively for development purposes.   
But if China is so successful in attracting FDI, why does it still insist on accumulating a 
large stockpile of foreign-exchange reserves—far larger than that of any other developing 
country? In 2003, for instance, China increased its foreign-exchange reserves by about US$ 117 
billion and had accumulated total gross reserves of over US$ 416 billion. By 2004, its total gross 
reserves had jumped to US$ 616 billion. 
There are several reasons for this policy. First, if China sold these reserves in the domestic 
market, they would cause an increased purchase of imports, and thus a reduction of its current 
account surplus. Since China is successful in attracting FDI, it does not need to finance the 
import of capital goods. Instead of selling foreign exchange, China’s central bank sells 
government securities in order to mop up excess liquidity. This helps hold down inflation and 
real appreciation of its quasi-fixed exchange rate.  
Another reason for sterilization is that although China’s gross domestic investment is 
lower than its gross domestic savings, both are relatively high by international standards 
(Table 6). Expanding investment even more rapidly could over-heat the economy and drive up 
the price level, particularly the prices of inputs vital for industrialization. China’s economy is 
driven mostly by public investment and FDI, less so by domestic private investment. 
An additional reason for China’s stockpiling of reserves is that since Japan and the 
European Union are not dynamic markets for China’s exports, China has relied heavily on the 
huge U.S. market. By holding large stocks of U.S. dollar-denominated reserves, China helps  
the U.S. finance its large current-account deficits (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2004). 
Through its attraction of foreign investors and its holdings of U.S. dollar-denominated reserves, 
China exerts considerable influence in blunting a protectionist backlash against its access to 
the huge U.S. market.  
TABLE 6 
Capital Flows, Savings and Investment for Selected Countries 2003 
Country China India Indonesia Brazil S. Africa 
Current Account Balance ($ Billion) 45.9 8.2 7.5 4.0 -1.5 
Net Private Capital Inflows ($ Billion) 59.5 10.7 -3.7 13.4 4.1 
Change in Gross Reserves ($ Billion) 116.8 30.6 4.0 11.7 0.6 
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP) 47 22 22 22 19 
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) 44 24 16 19 17 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005. 
 
Less well known is that China’s holding of US dollar-denominated reserves also indirectly 
finances the inflow of U.S. capital into China. This also helps build a powerful lobby in the U.S. 
for maintaining extensive trade relations with China. China’s reserves are huge because they 
result from surpluses on both the current and capital accounts. The surplus on both accounts 
in 2003 was about US$ 105 billion while the addition to China’s gross reserves was about the 
same, namely, US$ 117 billion (Table 6). 
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Until China has succeeded in building a large-scale, modern and internationally 
competitive industry—which is able to absorb its vast underemployed workforce (totaling 
about 200 million workers by some estimates)—it does not have a strong motivation to alter 
its development strategy. Its current mix of structural policies, including aggressive promotion 
of exports and inducements to FDI, closely regulated credit, a tightly managed exchange rate, 
capital controls and a large precautionary build-up of foreign-exchange reserves, has helped 
deliver a rapid and sustained process of capital accumulation and industrialization.  
As industrialization continues to absorb its underemployed workers (some of whom are being 
shed by the restructuring of state-owned enterprises), real wages in China are likely to rise over 
time. The drawback of such a strategy, however, is the persistence of high domestic inequality. 
While exceedingly successful, China’s strategy is not likely to be immediately replicated by 
many other developing countries. Countries that have export potential as well as a large 
domestic-market potential, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa, could conceivably 
follow a similar pattern. But most other developing countries—especially those that are 
smaller—would have difficulty in doing so.  
Even compared to such other large developing countries as the four just mentioned, 
China is doing exceedingly well (Table 6). Both its gross domestic savings and investment are 
far higher. It also runs much higher current account surpluses and attracts much larger net 
inflows of private capital. But it also accumulates much larger foreign-exchange reserves.  
Only India and Brazil are comparable in both running sizeable current account surpluses and 
attracting considerable net private capital inflows. 
7.3  POLICY OPTIONS FOR LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES 
Under current conditions, low-income developing countries are unlikely to succeed in 
replicating the Chinese model of development. Indeed, significant numbers of them are now 
generating current-account surpluses. Prominent examples include India, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Angola, Ghana and Nigeria. But in most of these cases, such a capital-exporting stance is 
probably ill-advised. Most low-income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are running 
current-account deficits, i.e., importing capital rather than exporting it.  
In order to jumpstart development, they need a substantially higher injection of real 
external resources. Most of this injection will have to come from Official Development 
Assistance. This will allow them to widen their current-account deficits. However, the global 
challenge is much larger than increasing ODA: additional means have to be found to re-direct 
global excess savings from rich countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Spain and Australia, to low-income, resource-starved developing countries. 
The Millennium Development Goals campaign has been building public support for a 
doubling of Official Development Assistance. But compared to the absolute sums of financing 
involved in the global transfer of resources to rich countries, ODA can play only a limited 
redistributive role. Its main role will be to finance more extensive public-investment 
programmes in poor countries. Such an injection of public savings will help re-establish a new 
higher balance between domestic savings and investment in these countries. However, within 
the context of the severe imbalances in resource flows distorting the world economy, 
additional efforts will need to be undertaken, such as building new global mechanisms that 
can channel international liquidity to poorer countries.  
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Moreover, adequately addressing global imbalances will require many countries to 
undergo substantial structural adjustment, namely, fundamentally redirecting their economic 
policies. The initial locus of such changes should be rich countries. The United States will have 
to bring its mammoth fiscal and trade deficits under control. Other rich countries that are 
running large current-account surpluses will have to employ more expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies in order to stimulate aggregate domestic demand and provide a broader 
basis for global growth. This will be essential for absorbing increased exports from low-income 
developing countries.  
Low-income countries should also be allowed to pursue more expansionary, growth-oriented 
economic policies. Relative to their pressing needs for rapid growth and poverty reduction, 
they have been ‘over-stabilized’—namely, required to adopt excessively restrictive 
macroeconomic policies. Donor conditionalities need to be re-aligned with objectives of 
growth and human development rather than restricted to achieving macroeconomic stability. 
Expenditure-switching policies are certainly not relevant for these countries: they badly need 
policies to promote dramatic demand expansion. 
Such expansion will be contingent not only on their domestic economic policies but also 
on improvements in the global environment. Greater prosperity in Japan, Germany and other 
countries in the European Union will be critical to broadening the base for global growth and 
increasing demand for exports from low-income countries. Dynamic middle-income countries, 
such as China, Malaysia and Thailand, will also be important in augmenting such demand. 
Lastly, global mechanisms for the redistribution of international liquidity should be 
developed. Poor countries need greater protection from the instabilities inevitably arising from 
the extreme imbalances in global resource flows. Issuing a global pool of reserves each year 
(such as Special Drawing Rights) that could be distributed disproportionately to poor countries 
would help overcome the deflationary bias of the current international reserve system (Stiglitz 
and Charlton, 2005).  
If poor developing countries were able to draw on such entitlements when confronting 
crisis, they could avoid having to amass a large precautionary stockpile of reserves. Thus, they 
could avoid the steep opportunity costs involved in redirecting resources away from 
productive domestic investment for growth and development towards an accumulation of idle 
foreign-exchange reserves. A more equitable injection of liquidity is becoming increasingly 
important as low-income countries struggle to contain the impact of rising oil prices on their 
current-account deficits. 
8  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The U.S. economy is monopolizing global excess savings. It currently absorbs about two-thirds of 
the total flow. Rich countries, such as Japan and Germany, export capital that accounts for about 
half of the U.S. capital imports. A significant share of the rest comes from middle-income 
countries. Oil exporters loom large in this grouping. However, other rapidly growing developing 
countries, such as China, also export a significant amount of capital. Even a sizeable number of 
low-income countries, such as India, Indonesia and Nigeria, are capital exporters.  
The resulting global imbalances in resources flows are not only unsustainable but also 
inequitable. The U.S. is piling up increasing liabilities to the rest of the world by running 
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mammoth current-account deficits. In the process, both the U.S. household sector and the 
government are sinking deeper into debt. Either U.S. policymakers have to dramatically 
restructure expenditures or risk triggering a severe recession that will force a much quicker, 
more painful adjustment. Such an outcome will also, lamentably, impose huge costs on the 
rest of the world since the U.S. is the most prominent global consumer of exports. 
Current resource flows are inequitable because the world’s largest rich country is 
consuming significantly beyond its domestic income. In order to do so, it is cornering the lion’s 
share of global excess savings. Instead, these resources could be re-cycled to poorer countries 
badly in need of development finance. Even an MDG-inspired doubling of ODA to poor 
countries could only modestly redress this massive imbalance.  
New mechanisms, such as a global fund for pooling liquidity, need to be found to create 
more space for expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in low-income countries. Removing 
onerous conditionalities that compel policymakers in these countries to restrict government 
spending and contain credit to the private sector would also be critical. But rich countries will 
have to take the lead in dramatically restructuring their expenditures in order to adequately 
correct global imbalances. They cannot blame middle-income countries that are implementing 
successful strategies of development, such as China, for their own maladjustment. 
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20. These holdings increased to US$ 616 billion in 2004 and are projected to reach US$ 826 billion in 2005, according to 
IMF statistics (World Economic Outlook 2005, Table 35, p. 259). 
21. See World Bank 2005a for a detailed discussion. 
22. Adjustment should also occur in some of the richer oil-exporting countries. 
23. See Keith Griffin (1970), “Foreign Capital, Domestic Savings and Economic Development,” Bulletin of the Oxford 
University Institute of Economics and Statistics, May. 
24. Recently, the Chinese government has been shrewdly starting to use foreign-exchange reserves in order to 
recapitalize state-owned banks with a large stock of non-performing loans. 
25. The basic argument in this section on China is similar, in part, to that in Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2004. 
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